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 1. Introduction 
The recent wave of banking crises stemming from developed countries, from the sub-prime-Lehman crisis in the 
US, to the European cases of Iceland, Ireland and Spain, have spurred a renewed interest in the quest for “early 
warning” indicators, signals of troubles ahead that may, with some confidence and anticipation, flag the need for 
preemptive action. In the European case, banks’ exposure to collapsing real estate prices have threatened the 
joint solvency of the banking sector as well as of the sovereign, as in the classical “twin” paradigm described by 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and experienced in many episodes of the past three decades in emerging markets 
(the “Asian crisis” comes to mind). As in the past, the new wave of crises took most international financial 
institutions, such as the EU and the ECB, as well as rating agencies and academics, by surprise, as most 
forecasters grossly under-estimated the likelihood of such crises. The costs of the bailouts, their implication for 
government finances and sovereign solvency are so large that the failure to anticipate such events and to respond 
adequately are today the most serious threats to the very existence of the Euro area. 
There has been a significant amount of research regarding early warnings of banking crises, particularly for 
emerging markets, and there is agreement on the presence of common pattern of economies that end up in a 
crisis: for example, credit booms and poor banking supervision, together with “unsustainable” current account 
imbalances, very often lead to real estate and stock market bubbles and crashes, and ultimately to banking crises, 
see for example Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). However, the interdependence between the financial institutions’ 
balance sheets, interest rates and the macroeconomic outlook is still not properly analyzed. Most analysts and 
practitioners continue to use simple regression analysis for forecasting, despite the fact that these models are ill-
suited for uncovering the joint effects of these indicators. 
Our aim in this paper is to provide answers to the following questions. What set of macroeconomic and balance 
sheet conditions for the banking sector are jointly associated to a country’s exposure to the risk of a banking 
crisis? Can we derive “thresholds” for vulnerability/resilience indicators that effectively identify high/low 
banking risk profiles?  
We employ a state-of-the-art empirical technique borrowed from the statistical literature on “perturbation and 
combination” algorithms (Breiman, 2001; Friedman and Popescu, 2003) in order to build an early warning 
model for banking crises in emerging markets. The methodology condensates the relevant information on future 
crises into the monitoring of a small set of predictors, their interactions, and “threshold” values. Technically, our 
approach offers an interesting solution to the trade-off between the “in sample” fit and the “out-of-sample” 
predictions. Typically, there is a trade-off between the model’s ability in fitting the data, and its out-of-sample 
predictive power. This goal is achieved by applying the CRAGGING algorithm of Vezzoli and Stone (2007). 
The algorithm effectively mimics the possibility of extracting multiple random samples from the original data, so 
that the resulting model performs well when applied to new data. We compare our approach with other 
 commonly used techniques, such as Stepwise Logit and Classification Trees, and we rank them in terms of their 
out-of-sample prediction accuracy. The main findings of the paper are as follows.  
First, not all banking crises are equal:  our early warning model identifies two basic types of banking crises in 
emerging markets. The first (that we label “Latin American crisis”) is the result of a (past) credit boom and a  
flight from domestic assets, followed by very high levels of interest rates on bank deposits, possibly reflecting 
fears of a run, and/or serious banks’ illiquidity. The second type (“Asian crisis”) is preceded by a boom in real 
investment, which is typically financed by banks’ foreign debt.  
Second, out of a large number (540) of possible predictors, ranging from macroeconomic to financial sector’s 
balance sheet indicators, we show that banking crises can be accurately predicted by just a handful of variables: 
the interest rate on deposits, the net accumulation of foreign asset/liabilities of the banking sector, the change the 
ratio of domestic credit to GDP, the ratio of real investment to GDP. 
Third, while all the examined competing econometric models present similar prediction capabilities in-sample, 
our model clearly dominates in terms of out-of-sample predictive power and robustness. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature on early warnings for banking 
crisis; Section 3 describes the data set, and Section 4 presents the methodology. Section 5 discusses the model as 
well as three alternative benchmarks. Section 6 contains the horse race between the different models and Section 
7 concludes. 
 
2. Review of the Literature  
Our study complements the vast empirical literature on Early Warning Systems (EWS) for banking crisis. This 
literature mainly concerns emerging markets, and has applied a variety of empirical methodologies, spanning 
from parametric (such as Logit or Probit regression) to non-parametric models (such as the Signal-to-Noise 
approach or Classification and Regression Trees). Among the papers employing the former methodology, 
Eichengreen and Rose (1998) use multivariate Probit regression for understanding the role of international 
shocks in determining banking crises in developing and emerging economies. They find that interest rate shocks 
stemming from OECD countries as well as their GDP growth rate have a significant and strong effect on bank 
fragility in developing countries. Hutchison (2002) estimates multivariate Probit models linking the probability 
of banking risks to domestic macroeconomic variables and institutional characteristics. He finds that the 
following variables are strongly and significantly associated to banking crisis: inflation, GDP growth, exchange 
rate turbulence 1  as well as variables describing the characteristics of the financial and the regulatory 
                                                            
1 Such a measure is constructed according to Glick and Hutchison (2001) from “large” changes in a weighted average index 
of monthly real exchange rate changes and monthly reserve losses. The weights are inversely related to the variance of 
 environments. González-Hermosillo (1999) is one of the first papers to exploit banks’ balance sheets at the 
micro level in order to explore the determinants of banking risks in a Panel-Logit framework. She finds that non-
performing loans and capital asset ratios appear to be the best predictors of banking crisis and that individual 
bank failures are not significantly affected by the systemic banking fragility, so that, despite balance sheet 
linkages, she finds little evidence of “contagion” between banks. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find that low GDP growth, high real interest rates, and high inflation are 
significantly correlated with the occurrence of a banking crisis. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) compare 
the results with the signal approach of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and show that their model performs better 
in terms of in-sample prediction. They find that banking crises are associated to low GDP growth, high real 
interest rates, and high inflation, strong growth of past bank credit and a large ratio of broad money to reserves. 
Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999) have similar findings and add real depreciation of the exchange rate and trade 
balance deterioration to the list of early warning predictors of banking crises. Kalotychou and Staikouras (2005) 
focus on Latin American and Asian countries. They find that debt and trade developments are correlated to the 
solvency of banks (but only for Latin American countries). More recently, Kraft and Galac (2007) examine the 
banking crises occurred in Croatia using Logit models, and find that high deposit interest rates were the most 
significant variable predicting bank failures. This finding is consistent with Keeley (1990), who argues that the 
increase in risk-taking following deregulation would lead to higher deposit interest rates, and with Hellman, 
Murdoch and Stiglitz (2000), who provide a theoretical connection between financial liberalization and the 
degree of the moral-hazard problem in the banking system, which leads towards financial crises (they find that 
under freely determined deposit rates, banks offer Pareto-inefficiently high deposit rates in an effort to steal 
share from their rivals, thus increasing the moral-hazard problem). The role of high interest rates, particularly on 
deposits, as a crucial predictor of banking crises, emerges quite clearly in the literature and is confirmed, and 
made precise, by our own analysis 
Davis and Karim (2008) employ an eclectic approach for predicting banking crises. They show that a 
multinomial Logit model is better suited for providing early warnings for systemic/global crises, whereas the 
signal extraction approach of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) performs better for country-specific ones. In terms 
of individual leading indicator performance, the Logit approach selects the ratio of M2 to official reserves and 
budget balance as the best indicators, while the signal approach identifies real GDP growth and the changes in 
the terms of trade as the best leading indicators. Finally, Lund-Jensen (2012) derives risk factor thresholds in the 
Logit framework and estimates the time varying conditional probability of a systemic banking crisis. He argues 
that this approach dominates the popular Signal-to-Noise approach in terms of type I and type II errors, and 
obtains the following list of leading indicators: banking sector leverage, equity price growth, the credit-to-GDP 
gap, real effective exchange rate appreciation, changes in the banks’ lending premium and the degree of banks 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
changes in each component over the sample for each country. Large changes in exchange rate pressure are defined as 
changes in the index that exceed the mean plus 2 times the country-specific standard deviation. 
 interconnectedness as measured by the ratio of non-core to core bank liabilities.  
On the non-parametric front, the prediction of banking crisis mainly employs the signal extraction approach and 
the Classification and Regression Trees methodologies. The former was firstly applied to banking crises by 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who focus on the ‘twin crises’ (currency and banking crises). They find that 
problems in the banking sector typically precede a currency crisis and such a link is bi-directional, since the 
collapse of the currency often generates a banking default, if assets are denominated in domestic currency and 
liabilities in foreign currency. Both types of crisis often occur during recessions, induced by either a worsening 
of the terms of trade, an overvalued exchange rate, a credit crunch or/and a sharp contraction in exports. 
Furthermore, financial liberalization and/or increased access to international capital markets fuels are often 
associated to credit booms and expose the banking sector to stock market and real estate crashes. Kaminsky 
(1999) and Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) refine this approach by combining several indicators into 
an aggregate composite index. Also, the same signal-based approach is used by Borio and Lowe (2002) and 
Borio and Drehmann (2009). In the first study, the authors conclude that credit aggregates and asset prices 
indicators together with the real exchange rate and the rate of growth are leading indicators of banking distress in 
both developed and emerging markets. In the second study, the authors add property prices to the list (Borio and 
Drehmann, 2009).  
Duttagupta and Cashin (2011) employ Classification and Regression Trees to study the determinants of banking 
crises in 50 emerging and developing countries during 1990-2005. The authors identifies three key crisis-prone 
conditions: (i) macroeconomic instability, with high annual inflation and relatively low terms of trade growth; (ii) 
low bank profitability, proxied by the spread between lending and deposit rates; (iii) high foreign exchange risk, 
with liability dollarization (foreign exchange deposits to official foreign exchange reserves) combined with 
either (a) relatively high depreciation, or (b) low bank liquidity (private credit to deposits). This is the paper 
which is closest, in terms of methodology and results, to ours. We improve on this paper, and, we think, on the 
literature, by introducing the state-of-the-art algorithm developed by Vezzoli and Stone (2007). The main 
advantages of our approach is that it extends the merits of the  Classification and Regression Tree methodology, 
by  preserving  the information structure contained in the panel dataset and by substantially improving the 
robustness and the reliability of the model for generating out-of-sample predictions and vulnerability  assessment. 
 
3. The Data Set 
We use the dataset on banking crises put together at the IMF by Laeven and Valencia (LV, 2010), which over 
the period of interest, 1980-2010, covers 85 emerging markets. The choice to focus on emerging markets, despite 
the recent wave of banking crises in the US and Europe (Iceland, Ireland and Spain, and the Scandivian episodes 
in the 1990s) is due to the fact that we want to test our methodology on a long and possibly homogenous set of 
 banking crisis episodes and want to compare our results with those of a well-established literature. We leave an 
application of our methodology to the European crises to a following paper.  
The in-sample analysis (1980-2007) features 79 episodes classified as “crisis”. For the more recent years, 2007-
2010 we combine the LV data with the Reinhart and Rogoff (RR, 2010) crisis periodization, and we obtain five 
extra episodes (Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Russia, Ukraine) all occurring in 2008. LV define an episode of 
banking crisis to occur when: 
 “… a country’s corporate and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and financial institutions 
and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. As a result, non-performing loans increase 
sharply and all or most of the aggregate banking system capital is exhausted. This situation may be 
accompanied by depressed asset prices (such as equity and real estate prices) on the heels of run-ups before the 
crisis, sharp increases in real interest rates, and a slowdown or reversal in capital flows. In some cases, the 
crisis is triggered by depositor runs on banks, though in most cases it is a general realization that systemically 
important financial institutions are in distress”.  
The definition of RR is quite similar, since they identify a banking crisis by the following two events: (1) a bank 
runs that leads to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions; or, 
in the absence of bank runs (2) a closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of one or more 
important financial institution. The episodes of banking crises (country-year) that appear in our dataset are 
reported in Table 1. Over the period 1980-2010 there are 84 banking crises, with an average duration of nearly 3 
years. They are clustered over the period 1995-1998, when one third of the total events (31 banking crises) takes 
place. More information on the data set is available in the LV paper. In constructing our “banking crisis” dummy 
variable we use only the first year of “crisis” and ignore the observations that occur during the following years in 
order to avoid endogeneity problems. The source for the explanatory variables is the Economist Intelligence 
Unit, which collects data from the OECD, the IMF, the BIS and the World Bank.  
In order to use our algorithm in a computationally efficient way we need the number of our candidate 
explanatory variables not to exceed about one hundred. Therefore we implement the following three step 
procedure. First, we start with an initial list of 105 variables, taken from the literature (we constraint the choice 
by excluding variables for which missing values in the sample period exceed 30% of the observations). By 
computing, where appropriate, GDP ratios, rates of changes (prefix “D”), first differences (prefix “DIF”), and 
considering two lags for each variable, we end up with a total of 529 candidate explanatory variables. Second, 
we employ the Random Forest algorithm (see Manasse and Roubini, 2009 for a discussion and an application) as 
a pre-selection device, and we retain only the variables with significant explanatory power2. This reduces the 
number of candidate predictors to 74. The final list of candidate predictors is in Table 2, which reports the 
                                                            
2 Specifically, we used the Variable Importance measure (Mean Decrease in Accuracy) retaining all variable showing a 
measure greater than zero. 
 variables names (excluding transformations). The list includes: (1) standard macroeconomic and national 
accounts variables; (2) variables from the balance of payments statistics; (3) external and domestic debt; (4) 
interest and exchange rates; (5) fiscal accounts and monetary aggregates; (6) banking sector balance sheet data; 
(7) global factors such as the Oil price, the TED spread (three-months Libor minus three-month US T-bill rate) 
and the Libor (with three-months maturity). 
  
4. Methodology 
Our methodology is a refinement of the Classification and Regression Trees (CART) technique developed by 
Breiman et al. (1984) and widely employed in different research fields such as genetics, engineering, marketing, 
finance. Manasse and Roubini (2009) apply CART for predicting sovereign debt crises, while Chamon, Manasse 
and Prati (2007) apply it to “sudden stops”. In short, CART is an algorithm that partitions the sample space of 
covariates, X, into homogeneous subsets with respect to the dependent variable Y. For example, in a binary 
problem where the Y’s are “crisis/non-crisis” indicators, the aim is to find “criteria” (expressed as inequalities) 
for the X, such that as many “crisis” as possible fall in one subset, and as many “non-crisis” fall in a different 
one. The aim is to identify the joint characteristics (the variables in X and their thresholds) that are associated 
with a “frequent occurrence” of the phenomenon of interest. For example, in the field of medicine, the likelihood 
of a heart attack may be found to be associated with a particular combination of individual characteristics, such 
as sex (= male), age (= above 45), blood pressure (= systolic pressure below 20), so that a patient jointly 
satisfying these traits can be considered “at risk”. Thus CART iteratively uses the actual values of predictors as 
“thresholds” that identify cases of disproportionate occurrence of crises. This technique presents numerous 
advantages (it is non-parametric, effectively deals with non-linearity, selects thresholds and interactions out of 
possibly a very large set of predictors), but it suffers from three main drawbacks (which, to be fair, also affect 
most standard econometric methods); see, among others, Chamon, Manasse, and Prati (2007). The first is model 
instability. The variables selected by the algorithm in the “top nodes” clearly have a disproportionate effect on 
the following choice of predictors, so that even a relatively small change in the data set (new observations on 
existing variables, or the addition of new variables to the data set) can give rise to very different models. The 
second is that CART’s predictive accuracy “out-of-sample” is often worse than that of other “hybrid” methods, 
those that combine different statistical techniques or different models (see Steinberg and Cardell, 1998). Finally, 
CART is designed for cross-sectional data, and therefore makes an inefficient use of information in panel data 
sets, since the observations relating to a particular unit, say a country, are effectively treated as if they concerned 
different units. 
The issue of predictive accuracy has been addressed by a large literature in statistics and econometrics. Recent 
contributions in statistics have developed the “perturbation and combination” approach. The idea is to take the 
 original data set and perturb it by creating many “artificial” samples, so that one can estimate multiple models 
and can generate multiple predictions which are can then averaged. This approach is followed in the “bagging” 
algorithm (Breiman, 1996), where estimation samples (training sets) are randomly generated by bootstrapping. 
The aim is to reduce the potential instability of forecasts and also to control for the problem of over-fitting. A 
similar approach is that of the “random forest” algorithm (Breiman, 2001), where many classification trees are 
calculated, by randomly selecting variables in different combinations as well as by generating different sub-
samples; in the “boosting” approach of Freund and Schapire (1996), the idea is to generate multiple simple “rule-
of-thumb” models for random portion of the data and then to combine them. All these statistical approaches 
generate predictions (a crisis probability for each observation, country-year) by averaging the outcomes of 
thousands of possibly different models. Thus they rely on black-box model which allow for no “economic 
intuition” and are impossible to interpret. In other words, predictive accuracy is obtained at the expenses of 
interpretability. Our approach here exploits the basic idea of “perturbation and combination” for achieving 
predictive accuracy without sacrificing the economic intuition.  
The other improvement concerns the efficient use of the panel data structure of the data. The CART algorithm 
was designed for cross-sectional data, where each observation pertains to a particular individual. By converse, 
the CRAGGING algorithm preserves the information contained in the data by treating all observations pertaining 
to an individual country as particular item (see below). 
 
4.1. The CRAGGING algorithm 
The empirical methodology, called CRAGGING (CRoss-validation AGGregatING) is formally presented in 
Vezzoli and Stone (2007) and Savona and Vezzoli (2012). Let (Y, X) be a panel data with N observations 
containing j units (in our case countries), with Jj ,,1 , observed at time t, with Tt ,,1 , covering a 
period from 1980 to 2007. Let  851 ,,,,L  j  be the set of the units and  11111 ,,,,   Rjtrjtjtjt xxxx   
be the vector of predictors relative to the unit j measured at time 1t  with Lj . Letting 74R  denote the 
number of explanatory variables for each country; consequently X is a RN  matrix. The “perturb and combine” 
technique consists in a two steps procedure.  
In the first step, L is randomly partitioned into 17V subsets, denoted by vL  (test set) with 17,,1 v , 
each one containing 5 VJJv  different countries (see Figure 1). The number of observations pertaining to 
each test set is denoted by vN . We then randomly select a test set (e.g. 1v : Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, Hungary, 
Latvia in Figure 2) that is taken out of the observations used for estimation and reserved for testing. Thus the 
corresponding training (estimation) set is denoted by cLv , obtained as vv L-LL
c   and containing 80cvJ  units 
 and cvN  observations. It follows that 
cLv  includes 16117   test sets. By removing one unit (country) l from 
cLv  we estimate a regression tree
3 on the perturbed training set  c l\Lv  (see step A in Figure 2). After the 
perturbation, 
c
lL \v  contains 79 countries  180 . Next, we test the regression tree on the set vL . At this point, 
the l-th country is reinserted in the training set and the same procedure is repeated for each l  in cvL  (see step B in 
Figure 2), thus obtaining 80 predictions of default probabilities for each country-year belonging to the test set 
(from 1yˆ  to 80yˆ  in Figure 2). These iyˆ , with 80,,1 i , are averaged for each unit of the test set (see step 
C in Figure 2) and a single predicted probability of crisis is obtained for each country-year of the test set . This 
particular type of perturbation, conceived with the end of maintaining the hierarchical structure of the panel data, 
is repeated for the remaining 16 test sets. In this way, each unit always appears either in training set used for 
estimation, or in the test set used for validation, but never in both at the same time. More precisely, we estimate 
13608017  cvJV  regression trees, adopting what statistician call “double cross-validation”: the leave-
one unit out cross-validation and the v-fold cross-validation (when sample observations are randomly split into v 
sub-samples and one, in turn, is reserved for validation purposes). To increase the accuracy of predictions, we 
repeat the original partition of the set L 40 times (for a total of 54400401360   regression trees), thus 
generating different groupings of the original 85 countries. We thus simulate situations in which the available 
data for estimation are different. We end up by averaging all the predicted crisis probabilities for each 
observation in the sample computing 32004080   predictions of crisis probabilities for each country-year 
observation. 
The second step takes care of interpretation. We replace the original binary (0, 1) definition of crisis by the 
probabilities generated in step one, so that the original “coarse” definition of a crisis is replaced by a continuous 
variable, approximating the “degree of vulnerability” to a crisis. We use this as a dependent variable of 
regression tree and obtain the best predictors, thresholds and interactions, as usual. Implicit here is the idea that 
not all banking crises are alike, ex ante: they stem from a combination of different fundamentals’ vulnerabilities 
and random events. Thus the binary indicator represents a necessary simplification, a coarse description of 
situations which ex-ante had different likelihoods of ending up in a crisis, all though ex-post all did. We exploit 
the continuous measure derived in step 1 in order to estimate a (Final) Model that can be interpreted and used for 
prediction. 
 
5.1. The (Final) Model 
                                                            
3 The regression tree is estimated in correspondence of a tuning parameter, called ,  that modulates the trade-off between 
the complexity and the interpretability of the results. 
 The procedure outlined in the previous section generates the model depicted in Figure 3. The model selects the 
interest rate on bank deposit (lagged one year, RAT2) as the most important indicator of crisis vulnerability. In 
fact, in episodes when this rate exceeds 16.2 percent, the probability of observing a crisis in the following period 
rises from 4 percent, the ex-ante sample frequency, to 10.1 percent, as we move from the top node down to the 
right in the figure.  Conversely, a deposit rate below this threshold is associated to a crisis probability of only 2.6 
percent, as we move to the left of the root node.  
When the interest rate is above the threshold, two other variables are significantly associated to a higher 
probability of a banking crisis. The first is an abnormal year-to-year jump the banking sector’s net acquisition of 
foreign assets, occurring two years before the crisis (the rate of change of net foreign assets DNFAS, lagged 
twice, is above 80 percent), so that either domestic banks sharply raise their investments abroad and/or foreign 
residents reduce their domestic deposits, or both; this early capital flight is associated to a 10.5 percent 
probability of crisis. The second is a credit boom two years before the crisis (an acceleration of 11.62 percentage 
points in the rate of growth of domestic credit growth, DIFSODD), which pushes the default probability to 42.4 
percent. It is interesting to note that, as we saw in the literature review section, there is a large consensus on the 
importance of interest rates, credit booms and capital flights as predictors of EM’s banking crises.  High deposit 
rates signal lack of confidence in the banking system, a prelude to a run, and/or a large liquidity problem forcing 
banks to raise their deposits rates in order to contrast a flight of deposits. Similarly, capital flights are known to 
be associated to currency collapses and balance sheet mismatches, while credit booms fuels stock market and 
real estate bubbles. The characteristics of node 8 fit the stylized facts of many Latin American episodes in the 
mid-nineties (for example Costa Rica and Venezuela, 1994 share all the characteristics of this node). 
The model also identifies a somewhat different type of risky environment, one of a real investment boom 
financed by foreign borrowing of the banking sector, see node 4 on the left side of the tree. Here, despite lower 
interest rates on deposits, we observe three signs of vulnerability. The first is that the banking sector has large 
foreign net liabilities (net foreign assets, NFAS are negative and below 5% of GDP). Also, these liabilities are 
not being reduced at a sufficient pace (the lagged rate of change of banks’ foreign liabilities is above -77% year-
to-year).  These two features are associated to a crisis probability of 7.8 percent. The other early sign of 
weakness is an investment boom that pushes the ratio of investment to GDP above the threshold of 39.06 percent. 
Under this scenario the probability of a banking crisis moves from the unconditional 4 percent in the root node, 
to 36.8 percent in node 4. Here we find episodes epitomized by the “Asian crisis” label, which were 
characterized by a real  investment boom fuelled by domestic banks foreign borrowing, and where a currency 
crash lead to a “twin” bank and sovereign default. Episodes such as Malaysia and Thailand 1997, indeed belong 
to node 4. 
 
 5.2. The Competitor Models 
Since the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the merits of our model rely in its ability to accurately predict 
banking crises. For making a comparison we need some benchmark model(s). We could pick models in the 
literature, but that would not be very useful as forecasting performances depend on the actual data used for 
estimation and forecast. We prefer to build, to our best knowledge, three alternative models using the same 
sample for estimation and prediction. The first model is a Stepwise Logit (Slogit), the second is an ordinary 
Classification and Regression Tree (RT), and the third model is an average of the predictions of all the models, 
namely our “Final” Model (FM), the Slogit, and the RT.  
 
5.2.1. The Stepwise Logit 
The Logit approach is very common for estimating banking and sovereign debt crisis probabilities, as discussed 
in Section 2. We build our own model by following this procedure. We start from the list of the 74 variables 
selected for our FM. The Stepwise procedure includes one variable at a time into the regression and uses the  
criterion of adding additional variables as long as this reduces the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), starting 
from the variable that achieves the largest reduction, until it is not possible to obtain further improvements in the 
AIC. By this automatic procedure we obtain Model 3 in Table 3. Model 2 is the most parsimonious model, and it 
is obtained by eliminating from Model 3 all statistically insignificant variables as well as variables which, 
despite being statistically significant, show the “wrong” sign. This is the case of the change in the total external 
debt/GDP ratio (DIFTED), the change in the US T-bill rate (DIFTBILL), which (“wrongly”) appear to be 
negatively associated to the probability of a crisis, as well of the percentage change of commercial banks’ net 
foreign assets (DNFAS), which appears with a counter-intuitive positive coefficient. Our preferred model is 
Model 1 which differs from Model 2 because it adds in  two variables, the deposit interest rate (RAT2) and the 
percentage variation in BIS banks’ total liabilities (DBSDT), which are a priori plausible (have the “right” 
positive sign),  despite not being statistically significant. In the end, this model features the following 
explanatory variables: the ratio of exports to GDP lagged 2 years (PEXPLAG2), and the price of oil (OILLAG), 
which captures the impact on the financial  health of  oil producers, with expected negative sign; a positive 
association to the probability of a crisis is found for the rate on deposits (RAT2LAG), the average interest cost of 
external debt (EFIRLAG), the acceleration in BIS banks’ total liabilities (DBSDTLAG), the change in the ratio 
of short-term banks’ liabilities with respect to GDP (DIFBSD1_GDPLAG), the level of the US T-bill rate 
(TBILLLAG), the TED spread lagged 2 years (TEDLAG2), a proxy of banks’ borrowing costs, and finally the 
percentage change in commercial banks’ net foreign assets (DNFASLAG). 
 
 5.2.2. Classification and Regression Tree and the Average Model 
The second benchmark model is a Classification Tree, obtained from the same 74 variables obtained in the pre-
selection stage described before. The main difference with respect to the FM is that the latter is built to enhance 
its robustness to out-of-sample data. Overall, RT choice of variables is not that different from that of the FM: 
high deposit rates, credit booms, large foreign debt and capital flight are confirmed as most relevant early 
warnings of banking crises. The model is shown in Figure 4.  
Interestingly, the top variable selected by RT, the interest rate on banks’ deposit,  and its threshold value, 16%,  
are the same as those picked by the FM, which confirms this variable as the most critical early warning for 
banking crises. The consequences of the “perturb and aggregate” procedure however show up in the subsequent 
“splits” of the data. Unlike our model, RT identifies two risky sets of characteristics, both occurring when banks’ 
deposit rates exceed 16.24%. The first, see node 5, occurs when the country has suffered a large liquidity 
problem (when its “external financial requirements”, FNRQ, the sum of current account deficit and debt coming 
due, exceed 10% of GDP), it has experienced a large drop in Net Income flows in percentage of GDP (IGDP), 
and when the country has substantially increased its medium and long term borrowing from abroad (including 
commercial bank loans, official guaranteed loans and international bond issues). These circumstances are 
associated to a 28.4 percent probability of bank default. The second risky combination is found in node 4, where 
in addition to high deposit rates and financial requirements, the banking sector has expanded its lending very 
rapidly (the rate of change in bank lending, SODC, exceeds 15%).  
Finally, the last benchmark model is built by following the averaging approach common in the EWS literature 
(e.g. Fuertes and Kaloutychou, 2007), which argues that often the best predictions are obtained by combining the 
predictions of many competing models. Thus, we take the simple averages of the crisis probabilities generated 
for each observation by our three models (FM, Slogit, RT), and we label this black-box model as Average Model 
(Ave). 
 
6. Comparing the Models’ Performances 
In this section we assess the performances of the different models in predicting banking crises, both “in sample”, 
over the same observations used to estimate the model, 1980-2007, and out-of-sample, 2008-2010. The results 
are sensitive to the choice of probability threshold above which one decides to classify an observation as “crisis”. 
This choice determines the trade-off between type I error (probability of “missing” a crisis) and type II error 
(probability of erroneously “calling” a crisis, or “false alarm”). Should one choose a very low threshold (e.g. 
zero) the models would always “call a crisis” (and correctly predict all crises, with zero type I error) at the 
expenses of always misclassifying “non-crises” (100% type II error). Therefore we report each model’s 
 predictive accuracy, for both crisis and non-crisis episodes, at different cut-off points.  
 
6.1. In-Sample Accuracy 
 We start from the in-sample performance. Figure 5 reports the percentage of crisis episodes correctly classified 
(on the y-axis), for each value of the cut-off point (x-axis). The FM is represented by a dot, the Slogit by a trait, 
the RT by a white square, the Ave by a triangle. Clearly, at very low thresholds, below 2 percent, all model 
perfectly predict crises (they always predict crises), while at very high levels, above 50 percent, all models  
always fail to predict crises (they always predict a non-crisis). For the reason previously discussed, the 
percentage of correct predictions of crisis falls as we raise the threshold. Models, however, behave very 
differently for thresholds in the range 2-5 percent. It makes sense to focus on what happens around the cut-off 
point of 3.55 percent, which is the sample frequency of actual defaults in the sample (79 defaults over a total of 
2,222 pooled observations), so that we may decide to classify an observation as “crisis” whenever the model 
assigns to it a probability higher than the sample frequency. First note that that the ranking of the models’ 
performances changes with the threshold: for example, at 3.55 percent the Slogit is the best model (it predicts 70% 
of crisis) and the RT is the worse (only 42%), with our FM in the middle. However, when we raise the cut off to 
5 percent, the Ave becomes the most accurate; the Slogit is only third-best while the FM keeps its position. 
Figure 6 shows the accuracy in predicting non-crises. As we raise the cut-off probability for calling a crisis, all 
models predicts more tranquil episodes. Relative to the previous case, there is less differentiation among models 
because tranquil times represent about 96.5 percent of the observation and are much easier to predict. At the 
benchmark cut-off of 3.55 percent, we have a perfect reversal of the previous models ranking: the Slogit, which 
was the best (70%) for crisis prediction, becomes the worst for non-crises (60%) because of the large number of 
“false alarms” it implies, and the opposite occurs for the RT.  
A general way to summarize the models’ performances is to consider both Type I (missing crisis) and Type II 
(false alarms) errors. Let LF denote a loss function, defined as a weighted average of the two probability errors : 
    errorIITypeerrorITypeLF   1  
By letting the weight δ vary between 0 (zero cost assigned to missing a crisis relative to missing a tranquil 
episode) and 1 (very high relative cost assigned to missing a crisis), we can measure the extent of the prediction 
errors of each model, for each cut-off point. Figure 7 shows the LF associated to each model, for different cut-off 
probabilities. Each model is represented by a vertical segment and a box. The segment’s extremes, outside the 
box, correspond to the largest/lowest values of the LF taken as δ varies on the unit interval. The boxes’ floor and 
ceiling correspond to the loss evaluated, respectively, at 1  and 0 . For example, the Slogit at 3.55% cut-
off correctly predicts 70% of crises (see Figure 5) so that the box’s floor 1 corresponds to 
   %30%7011  errorITypeLF . Similarly, the Slogit predicts about 60% of tranquil episodes (see 
Figure 6), so that at 0 , the box’s ceiling corresponds to   %40%6010  errorIITypeLF .  The 
dot inside the box shows the value of the Loss for 5.0 , when the two errors have equal weights,  5.0LF
The diagram gives a visual representation of both the model “average” performance (the dot) and of its 
robustness to different preferences on δ (the height of the box). Figure 7 shows that the models do not 
substantially differ in terms of their average in-sample accuracy, although they vary considerably in terms of 
their robustness to type I and type II errors. In particular, using the cut-off 3.55%, the Slogit and FM models are 
much less sensitive to changes in the preference parameter δ than the other models. 
 
6.2. Out-of-Sample Accuracy 
Predicting out-of sample is much more difficult, since there are only 5 banking crises (Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Latvia, Russia, and Ukraine), among the 255 observations of the period 2008-10. Looking at crisis prediction, 
Figure 8, we see that most models either always call a crisis (at low cut-off point), or never call a crisis, at high 
cut-offs. Note, however, that for thresholds crisis probabilities between 3.55% and 5%, the FM model is the only 
one which consistently correctly predicts all the five crises, while the others predict none. As Figure 9 shows, 
this does not come at the cost of many false alarms: while correctly classifying all crises, the FM correctly 
classifies 80% of tranquil episodes. Figure 10 presents the Loss Function plots for cut-off points of 2, 3.55, and 
5%. For the latter two values, the FM has an average loss function about one fifth of the competing models; 
moreover, FM is by far the most robust to changes in the risk preference parameter, so that it clearly outperforms 
all other models for most preference weights assigned to the different error types. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has employed a state-of-the-art algorithm (CRAGGING) borrowed from the statistical literature in 
order to build an early warning model for banking crises in emerging markets. The methodology condensates the 
relevant information on future crises into the monitoring of a small set of predictors, interactions, and “threshold” 
values. The idea is to take the original dataset and perturb it many times by creating “artificial” samples, so that 
we can construct a flexible model which may perform well when applied to new data, while at the same time 
preserving the model’s interpretability. We find that, out of a large number (540) of possible predictors, from 
macro to balance sheet indicators of the country’s banking sector, we can accurately predict banking crises by 
just a handful of variables: the interest rates on bank deposits, the net accumulation of foreign asset/liabilities of 
the banking sector, the change the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, the ratio of investment to GDP. Our model 
identifies two basic types of banking crises in emerging markets. The first (“Latin American type”) is the result 
 of a (past) credit boom, a flight from domestic assets, followed by very high levels of interest rates on deposits, 
possibly due to a bank run, and/or serious banks’ illiquidity. The second (“Asian type”) is characterized by an 
investment boom financed by banks' foreign debt.  We also compare our model to a Stepwise Logit, a 
Classification Tree, and an “Average” model, built on the same data. While all the econometric models show 
similar prediction capabilities in-sample, our model strongly dominates the others in terms of out-of-sample 
predictive power, both because it delivers more accurate predictions of crisis and less false alarms, and because 
it is more robust with respect to different preferences regarding the costs of missing a crisis or sending out a false 
alarm. 
  
 References 
Borio, C. and P. Lowe (2002). “Assessing the Risk of Banking Crises”, BIS Quarterly Review, December, 43-54. 
Borio, C. and M. Drehmann (2009). “Assessing the Risk of Banking Crises – revisited”, BIS Quarterly Review, 
March, 29-46 . 
Breiman, L. (1996). “Bagging Predictors”, Machine Learning, 26, 123-140 
Breiman, L. (2001). “Random Forests”, Machine Learning, 45, 5-32. 
Breiman, L., J. Friedman, R. Olshen and C. Stone (1984). Classification and Regression Trees. Wadsworth Inc., 
California. 
Chammon, C., P. Manase and P. Prati (2007). “Can We Predict the Next Capital Account Crisis?”, IMF Staff 
Papers, 54(2). 
Davis, E. and D., Karim (2008). “Comparing Early Warning Systems for Banking Crisis”, Journal of Financial 
Stability, 4, 89-120. 
Duttagupta R. and P. Cashin (2011). “Anatomy of Banking Crises in Developing and Emerging Market 
Countries”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 30, 354-376. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache (1998). ‘The Determinants of Banking Crises: Evidence from 
Developing and Developed Countries”, IMF Staff Papers, 45, 81-109. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache. (2000). “Monitoring Banking Sector Fragility: A Multivariate Logit”, 
World Bank Economic Review, 14(2), 287-307. 
Eichengreen, B. and A. Rose (1998). “Staying Afloat When the Wind Shifts: External Factors and Emerging-
Market Banking Crises”, NBER Working paper no. 6370, January. 
Freund, Y. and R. Schapire (1996). “Experiments with a New Boosting Algorithm”, Machine Learning: 
Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference, Morgan Kauffman, San Francisco, 148-156. 
Friedman, J. and J. Popescu (2003). Importance Sampled Learning Ensembles. Technical Report, Department of 
Statistics, Stanford University. 
Fuertes, A.  and E. Kalotychou (2007). “Optimal Design of Early Warning Systems for Sovereign Debt Crises”, 
International Journal of Forecasting, 23(1), 85-100. 
González-Hermosillo, B. (1999). “Determinants of Ex-Ante Banking System Distress: A Macro-Micro 
Empirical Exploration of Some Recent Episodes”, IMF Working Paper 99/33, March. 
Glick, R. and M. Hutchison (2001). “Banking and Currency Crises: How Common Are Twins?” in R. Glick, R. 
Moreno and M. Spiegel (eds.), Financial Crises in Emerging Markets, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
UK. 
Hutchinson, M. (2002). “European Banking Distress and EMU: Institutional and Macroeconomic Risks”, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104(3), 365-389. 
Kalotychou, E. and S.K. Staikouras (2005). “The Banking Exposure to International Lending: Regional 
Differences or Common Fundamentals”, Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments (NYU), 14, 187-214. 
Kaminsky, G. (1999). “Currency and Banking Crises: the Early Warnings of Distress”, IMF Working Paper, No. 
99/178. 
 Kaminsky, G. and C. Reinhart (1998). “Financial Crises in Asia and Latin America: Then and Now”, American 
Economic Review, 88 (2), 444-448. 
Kaminsky, G. and Reinhart, C.M. (1999), ‘The Twin Crises: the Causes of Banking and Balance of Payments 
Problems’, American Economic Review, 89, 473-500. 
Goldstein, M., G. Kaminsky and C. Reinhart (2000). “Assessing Financial Vulnerability. An Early Warning 
System for Emerging Markets”, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC. 
Hardy, D. and C. Pazarbasioglu (1999), “Determinants and Leading Indicators of Banking Crises: Further 
Evidence”, IMF Staff Papers, 46, 3, 247-58. 
Hellmann, T., K. Murdock and J. Stiglitz (2000). “Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking and Prudential 
Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?”,  American Economic Review, 90 (1), 147-165. 
Keeley, M. (1990). “Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking”, American Economic Review, 80 
(5), 1184-1200. 
Kraft, E. and T. Galac (2007). “Deposit Interest Rates, Asset Risk and Bank Failure in Croatia”, Journal of 
Financial Stability, 2 (4), 312-336 
Lund-Jensen, K. (2012). “Monitoring Systemic Risk based on Dynamic Thresholds”, IMF Working Paper, No 
12/159. 
Manasse, P. and N. Roubini (2009). “Rules of Thumb for Sovereign Debt Crises”. Journal of International 
Economics 78 (2), 192‐205. 
Laeven, L. and F. Valencia (2010). Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, ”, IMF 
Working Paper, No 10/146. 
Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff (2009). This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff (2010). From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis. NBER Working Paper no 15795, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Savona, R. and M. Vezzoli (2012). “Fitting and Forecasting Sovereign Defaults Using Multiple Risk Signals.” 
Cà Foscari University of Venice, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 26. 
Steinberg, D. and N.S. Cardell, (1998), “Improving Data Mining With New Hybrid Methods”, Salford Systems, 
http://docs.salford-systems.com/newhybridmethods.pdf 
Vezzoli, M. and C. Stone (2007). “Cragging”, manuscript, Department of Statistics, University of California, 
Berkeley also published in Book of Short Papers CLADAG 2007, University of  Macerata, September 12-14, 
2007. 
 
 
  
 Table 1: Banking Crisis 1980-2010 
Start Year Average Duration Nobs of crises Countries 
1980 3.0 3 Argentina-Egypt-Morocco 
1981 5.0 3 Chile-Mexico-Uruguay 
1982 3.0 5 Colombia-Ecuador-Ghana-Kuwait-Turkey 
1983 1.8 4 Equadorial Guinea-Peru-Philippines-Thailand 
1985 1.0 1 Kenya 
1986 1.0 1 Bolivia 
1987 3.6 5 Bangladesh-Cameroon-Costa Rica-Mozambique-Tanzania 
1988 3.7 3 Ivory Coast-Panama-Senegal 
1989 2.8 4 Argentina-El Salvador-Jordan-Sri Lanka 
1990 4.3 6 Brazil-Algeria-Burkina Faso-Lebanon-Nicaragua-Romania 
1991 3.7 3 Hungary-Nigeria-Tunisia 
1992 3.0 3 Estonia-Poland-Kenya 
1993 1.5 2 India-Togo 
1994 3.1 7 Bolivia-Brazil-Haiti-Costa Rica-Mexico-Venezuela-Uganda 
1995 2.7 9 Argentina-Azerbaijan-Latvia-Lithuania-Cameroon-Paraguay-Swaziland-Zambia-
Zimbabwe 
1996 2.0 3 Bulgaria-Jamaica-Yemen 
1997 3.3 6 Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines-Korea Rep.-Thailand-Vietnam 
1998 2.3 6 China-Colombia-Ecuador-Croatia-Russia-Ukraine 
2000 2.0 2 Nicaragua-Turkey 
2001 3.0 1 Argentine 
2002 4.0 1 Uruguay 
2003 2.0 1 Dominican Republic 
2008 ongoing 5 Hungary-Kazakhstan-Latvia-Russia-Ukraine 
    
Average 2.806 3.000  
The table reports the number of banking crises occurred over the period 1980-2010. The crises are grouped based on the 
start date. Average duration is computed in years and it is calculated using the banking crises with the same start date.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2: Banking Crisis Predictors 
Code Description 
BEXP Central government outlays (state budget) (% of GDP) 
BREP Central government receipts (state budget) (% of GDP) 
BSD1 BIS banks’ liabilities 0-1 year 
BSD 1_GDP BIS banks’ liabilities 0-1 year over GDP 
BSD3_GDP BIS banks’ liabilities over 2 years over GDP 
BSDT BIS banks’ total liabilities 
BSDT_GDP BIS banks’ total liabilities over GDP 
CARA Current account balance (% GDP) 
COBL Commercial bank loans 
COBL_GDP Commercial bank loans over GDP 
DCPI Consumer prices (% change in local currency) 
DIMP Imports of Good & Services (% real change) 
DTPH Total external debt divided by population 
EFIR Effective interest rate (%): interest payments made on medium- and long-term debt in current year as a percentage of medium- and long-term external debt at the end of the previous year. 
EXCR Export credits: stock of official export credits, suppliers’ credits and bank credits officially guaranteed or insured by an export credit agency. 
EXPS Total exports (free-on-board) over GDP 
FNRQ Financing requirement: current-account balance plus principal due on public and private medium- and long-term debt and IMF debits 
FRAS Commercial banks’ foreign assets 
FRAS_FRLI Commercial banks’ foreign assets over Commercial banks’ foreign liabilities 
FRES Foreign-exchange reserves (excluding gold) 
FRLI Commercial banks’ foreign liabilities 
FRLI_GDP Commercial banks’ foreign liabilities over GDP 
GFDT Public medium & long-term external debt 
IGDP Net income flows over GDP 
IMLT Interest payments made on medium- and long-term debt 
IMPS Total imports of goods (cost-insurance-freight basis) 
LIBOR3 London Interbank Bank Offer Rate 3 Month (%) 
LRAT Commercial banks average lending rate to non-financial enterprises (%) 
MCOV Import cover (months): total international reserves divided by imports of goods and non-factor services expressed in months 
MLTD Medium & LT debt inflows: capital inflows generating medium- and long-term debt, consisting of commercial bank loans, official guaranteed loans and international bond issues 
MULC Official medium- and long-term debt owed to multilateral institutions, excluding the IMF 
NFAS Commercial banks’ net foreign assets 
NFAS_GDP Commercial banks’ net foreign assets over GDP 
NTDT Net debt: total external debt less total international reserves 
OFFC Medium- and long-term debt owed to official creditors 
OFGL Officially guaranteed loans: public and publicly guaranteed loans, excluding international bonds 
OIL Oil price (in US dollars per Barrel) 
PEXP Exports of Good & Services (% of GDP) 
PFDT Private medium & long-term external debt  
PFDT_GDP Private medium & long-term disbursed external debt over GDP 
PFIN Gross fixed investment (% of GDP) 
PGCE Government consumption expenditure at current market prices (% of GDP) 
 PIMP Imports of Good & Services (% of GDP) 
PRAM Principal repayments made on medium- and long-term debt owed to private creditors 
RAT2 Deposit interest rate (%) 
SMN1_GDP Stock of money M1 over gdp 
SODC Stock of domestic credit: Bank lending to public and private sectors, plus bank lending in domestic currency overseas. 
SODD 
Domestic credit growth (%): Percentage change in bank lending to public and private sectors, plus bank lending in domestic currency 
overseas. 
TBILL U.S. T-bill rate (%) 
TDBT Total external debt stock, comprising public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt, private non-guaranteed debt, use of IMF credit and short-term debt, at end-period 
TED Ted Spread (Libor minus U.S. T-bill ) 
TFDS Total foreign debt service over GDP 
TSPX Debt-service ratio: total external debt service paid (% of exports of goods, non-factor services, income and workers’ remittances) 
TSPY Debt-service over GDP 
TSTD Short term external debt owed by all sectors 
UNEM Recorded official unemployment as a percentage of total labour force. 
The table reports the variables used to estimate predicting models in the empirical analysis.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: Stepwise Logit estimates 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -2.1517 -2.8823 -3.0492 
(-3.9925***) (-5.8731***) (-6.7074***) 
PGCELAG2 -0.0680 
(-2.7391**) 
PEXPLAG -0.0964 -0.0092 
(-4.1641***) (-1.1747) 
PEXPLAG2 0.0888 -0.0471 -0.0533 
(3.9725***) (-1.9593*) (-2.3673**) 
DCPILAG2 -0.0009 
(-1.6868*) 
LRATLAG -0.0045 -0.0018 
(-2.1726**) (-1.5401) 
LRATLAG2 0.0023 
(2.7271**) 
RAT2LAG 0.0018 0.0019 4.92E-06 
(2.3833**) (2.4926**) (-0.1505) 
TSPYLAG2 -0.0846 
(-1.5821) 
EFIRLAG 0.0815 0.0573 0.0455 
(2.6931**) (2.2519**) (1.7952*) 
DBSDTLAG 0.2121 0.1766 0.1098 
(-1.5146) (1.7077*) (-1.269) 
DIFBSD1_GDPLAG 6.5886 5.1303 4.7400 
(2.5737**) (2.0918**) (1.9418*) 
TFDS_GDPLAG 7.3240 0.4793 
(2.0452**) (-0.1555) 
DPRAMLAG -0.2362 -0.1135 
(-2.0367**) (-1.3314) 
TBILLLAG 2.2808 0.2138 0.2262 
(3.6598***) (3.1565**) (3.4136***) 
LIBOR3LAG2 -2.0063 
(-3.4205***) 
TEDLAG2 2.0765 0.0988 0.1104 
(3.6419***) (1.6754*) (1.9083*) 
DIFTBILLLAG -2.1564 
(-3.3896***) 
DIFTEDLAG -0.2691 
(-2.4948**) 
DIFTEDLAG2 -0.2390 
(-3.1287**) 
 DFRASLAG -0.3618 
(-1.2602) 
DNFASLAG 0.0152 0.0136 0.0133 
(2.0897**) (1.9098*) (1.855*) 
DNFASLAG2 0.0377 
(2.1341**) 
OILLAG -0.0641 -0.0360 -0.0379 
(-3.9877***) (-3.4594***) (-3.7043***) 
FRLI_GDPLAG 0.0993 
(-0.9202) 
Log likelihood -279.7018 -306.6920 -317.0375 
MSE 0.0302 0.0322 0.0331 
Obs with Dep=0 2143 
Obs with Dep=1 79 
McFadden R-squared 0.1802 0.1011 0.0708 
Akaike info criterion 0.2743 0.2887 0.2944 
Schwarz criterion 0.3385 0.3246 0.3200 
The table reports Stepwise Logit estimates. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variables that are significant at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent significance level are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Model 1 is the pure Stepwise Logit estimation 
run over the 74 variables used to estimate the FM and RT. Model 2 is obtained by re-estimating Model 1 letting out the 
insignificant variables and those having the “wrong” sign (i. e. contrasting the economic expectation). Model 3 follows the 
same construction rule but starting from Model 2. Model 3 is our final Stepwise Logit model with selected variables and 
corresponding coefficients denoted in bold font.  
 
Figure 1: Partitioning the set L into V groups 
 
 
The figure depicts the randomly partition of the set L in V = 17 groups, each one containing 5 different countries. 
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 Figure 2: Perturb and Combine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure depicts the CRAGGING procedure in order to obtain the predicted probability of a banking crisis through 
averaging the probability estimates realized by perturbing and combining the panel data. 
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 Figure 3: Final Model 
 
The figure depicts the Final Model (FM) structure with corresponding splitting rules computed over the period 1980-2007. 
STD and Avg are the standard deviation and the arithmetic average of the dependent variable within each node, N is the 
number of observations within each node and W is the number effectively used in computing STD and Avg, possibly using 
different weighting scheme (see Breiman et al., 1984). 
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 Figure 4: CART 
 
The figure depicts the Classification Tree with corresponding splitting rules computed over the period 1980-2007. Each 
node reports the 0-1 Classification (Class) with corresponding number and percentage of 0 (non-crisis) and 1 (crisis). N is 
the number of observations within each node and W is the number effectively used in computing 0-1 statistics (counting and 
percentage) also reported in graphical terms (the coloured rectangle at the bottom of each node shows the 0(red)-1(blue) 
composition). 
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 Figure 5: In-Sample Crisis Predictions 
 
The figure reports the percentages of correcly classified crisis predictions for different cut-off points over the period 1980-
2007. The value of 3.55% is the sample frequency of actual defaults in-sample and it is used as the “benchmark” cut-off 
point to be used as crisis/non-crisis classification. 
 
Figure 6: In-Sample NoN-Crisis Predictions 
 
The figure reports the percentages of correcly classified non-crisis predictions for different cut-off points over the period 
1980-2007. The value of 3.55% is the sample frequency of actual defaults in-sample and it is used as the “benchmark” cut-
off point to be used as crisis/non-crisis classification. 
 Figure 7: In-Sample Loss Function Box Plots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure reports the box plots based upon the loss function values in-sample obtained by changing the cut-off points. The 
bottom and top of the box are the 25th and 75th percentile, and the indicator in the middle (the rumble) of the box is the 
50th percentile (the median). The minimum and the maximum of the the loss functions are indicated by the dashes.   
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 8: Out-Of-Sample Crisis Predictions 
 
The figure reports the percentages of correcly classified crisis predictions for different cut-off points over the period 2008-
2010. The value of 3.55% is the sample frequency of actual defaults in-sample and it is used as the “benchmark” cut-off 
point to be used as crisis/non-crisis classification out-of-sample. 
 
Figure 9: Out-Of-Sample NoN-Crisis Predictions 
 
The figure reports the percentages of correcly classified non-crisis predictions for different cut-off points over the period 
2008-2010. The value of 3.55% is the sample frequency of actual defaults in-sample and it is used as the “benchmark” cut-
off point to be used as crisis/non-crisis classification out-of-sample. 
  
 
Figure 10: Out-Of -Sample Loss Function Box Plots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure reports the box plots based upon the loss function values out-of-sample obtained by changing the cut-off points. 
The bottom and top of the box are the 25th and 75th percentile, and the indicator in the middle (the rumble) of the box is the 
50th percentile (the median). The minimum and the maximum of the the loss functions are indicated by the dashes. 
 
 
